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Abstract
We develop a simple two-country model of international trade in which the trans-
portation cost between countries is endogenously determined by decisions concern-
ing capacity and price (road toll, rail fare) of infrastructure. We evaluate alternative
regimes of pricing and investment, i.e., free access (e.g., public road), pricing and
investment by two governments, and private operation. Comparisons between free-
access and other regimes reveal that pricing plays a positive role of encouraging
investment. However, pricing by governments results in lower welfare since exces-
sively high prices are charged. We also show that higher welfare could be attained
by elaborating the design of bidding systems for the right to build and operate the
infrastructure.
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11 Introduction
Cross-border transport infrastructure plays the important role of supporting trade with
neighboring countries, which accounts for a signi￿cant share of total trade (Bougheas et
al., 1999; Limao and Venables, 2001). The recent wave of regional integration is leading
to greater needs for investment in the transport infrastructure serving the region, since
a well-developed transport infrastructure is essential for successful regional integration
(Fujimura, 2004). Examples of initiatives to facilitate regional integration include the
Trans-European Transport Network and the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Devel-
opment (ALTID) project.
Mun and Nakagawa (2008) discuss the problem of resource allocation concerning the
provision of cross-border transport infrastructure connecting two neighboring countries.
An investment in the infrastructure in one country decreases the transportation costs of
both import and export goods, which bene￿ts not only the home country but also the
neighboring country. In this case, independent decision making leads to under-investment
in infrastructure, since the investment decision of each country does not take into account
the bene￿t to the other country. Mun and Nakagawa focus on the role of foreign aid to
improve the ef￿ciency, and show that the aid may make not only the recipient but also
the donor better off. The limitation of this paper is that it focuses only on investment
decisions assuming that the price for using the infrastructure is free.
Although free access to transport infrastructure (such as public roads) is widely ap-
plied, there exist types of transportation modes that impose user charges for infrastructure
(railways, ports, airports). At the same time, there has been an increasing tendency of
tolling on public roads, for several reasons such as congestion management, obtaining
funds for road investments, etc. (Glaister and Graham, 2004; Lindsey, 2007). For exam-
ple, a truck tolling system was recently introduced in Germany in 2005.
The present paper extends our earlier work by including pricing policies. We develop
a simple two-country model of international trade where the transportation cost between
two countries depends on the capacity and price (e.g., road toll, rail fare) of infrastruc-
ture. The government of each country chooses the capacity and price of infrastructure use
within its territory so as to maximize the welfare of its citizens. The government faces the
following trade-off: investment in capacity would lower the transport cost and thereby in-
crease the gains from trade, but increase the ￿scal burden; raising the price would increase
the revenue but decrease the gains from trade.
The earlier result of under-investment in the case of free access may be modi￿ed
if we incorporate pricing; the decision rule of choosing the capacity becomes ef￿cient.
Investment induces increase in the volume of traded goods, which raises not only the
gains from trade but also the revenue from pricing. The latter effect plays the role of
giving the governments incentives for greater investment. However, the pricing rule is
inef￿cient in that each government charges an excessively high price for infrastructure
use. Thus, despite the ef￿cient investment rule, the resulting capacity does not attain the
optimal level.
We evaluate two regimes, with and without pricing, in terms of the ef￿ciency in pro-
vision of the infrastructure, welfare of the two countries, and the global welfare of the
two-country economy as a whole. Furthermore, considering the fact that a growing num-
ber of toll roads have been constructed and operated privately or by various forms of
2public-private partnerships (Roth, 1996), we examine alternative systems of providing
cross-border transport infrastructure, such as private operation, control of investment de-
cisions of private ￿rms by design of bidding for franchise.1
Recently, economists have become interested in pricing and the investment decisions
of the transport infrastructure by multiple governments (Bond, 2006; De Borger, Dunker-
ley, Proost, 2007; Fukuyama, 2006; Levinson, 2000).
Bond (2000) investigates the consequences of independent decision making by gov-
ernments concerning infrastructure investment, and examined the effects of trade liber-
alization on the incentive to invest. Fukuyama (2005) also discusses a similar problem
by means of numerical simulations. These papers focus only on investment decisions.
Levinson (2000) looks at strategic interactions between governments on a serial network.
Levinson keeps the capacity ￿xed, and focuses on the choice of revenue raising mecha-
nisms (tax versus toll). He ￿nds that larger regions are more likely to tax than smaller
regions.
Our paper is closely related to the recent work by De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost
(2007) that deals with pricing and investment in the setting of two transport links in series,
each of which is controlled by a different government. Transport links are congestible and
traf￿c on each link consists of local trips and transit. Transit trips are neither originated
from nor destined to one of two regions, while trips between neighboring regions are
assumed to be zero. De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2007) evaluate numerically the
effects of toll discrimination between local and transit trips. Our paper considers trips
between neighboring regions that would be quantitatively more important than transit
traf￿c in many cases. We evaluate a larger set of alternative regimes such as private
operation, etc., and obtain the ranking of different regimes analytically in the case that
two countries are symmetric.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of a
two-country economy. Section 3 presents alternative regimes concerning pricing and in-
vestment of cross-border transport infrastructure: free-access, pricing and investment by
national government, private operation, and user cost minimization. These alternative




Consider an economy with two countries, indexed by i (i = 1;2). There are li households
in Country i. All households in the same country have identical preferences and labor
skills. The two countries may be different in country size, income, and preferences.
1De Palma and Lindsey (2000) analyze road pricing in the case that roads are operated privately. Yang
and Meng (2000) investigate the effect of a new road project by BOT in the setting of network with route
choice. Verhoef (2007) evaluates alternative highway franchise regimes for different network structure,
such as parallel and serial. The primary interests of these works are the role of pricing to control traf￿c
congestion, and they do not deal with the situation that multiple governments are involved in pricing and
investment of the transport infrastructure.
3This economy produces three goods, which are indexed by 1, 2, and z. The produc-
tions of Goods 1 and 2 are completely specialized, i.e., Country i produces Good i. Unlike
Goods 1 and 2, Good z is produced in both countries, which is set as the numeraire. Labor
is the only input for the production of the three goods. Each household in the economy
consumes all three goods. Thus, Country i exports Good i and imports Good j (j 6= i).
Goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
When Goods 1 and 2 are traded, transportation costs are incurred. On the other hand,
Good z is transported without cost. The transportation costs of Goods 1 and 2 depend
on the capacity and price (e.g., road toll, rail fare) of infrastructure. We assume that the
transport infrastructure is produced from Good z with constant returns to scale technol-
ogy.
2.2 Consumption














i, and zi are respectively the consumption of Goods i, j, and z. We assume
that ui is strictly increasing, quasi-concave, and twice continuously differentiable. Each
household is endowed with one unit of labor and levied a poll tax. The household’s
disposable income, yi, is de￿ned as
yi = wi ￿ ￿i;
where wi is the wage rate in the country and ￿i is the poll tax. The budget constraint is
given by












i represent the prices of Goods i and j in Country i. We suppose that Goods
1 and 2 are non-inferior goods.










































Each of the three goods is produced with a linear production technology. The production
of Good i in Country i requires ai





i; for i = 1;2:
Since Good z is set as the numeraire, the following relation should hold
1 = wia
z
i; for i = 1;2;
where az
i is the amount of labor required to produce one unit of Good z in Country i.
42.4 Transportation and trade
We suppose that there is a single location in each country at which goods are produced
and consumed. We call this location as a market. Traded goods are transported between
two markets. Labor is only input for the production of the transportation service. The
transport cost from the market in Country i to the border, ci, is de￿ned as
ci = fi + witi;
where fi is the price of infrastructure use within Country i and ti is the amount of la-
bor required for transportation. We interpret ti as the transport time from the market in
Country i to the border of the two countries. ti depends on the capacity of the transport
infrastructure in Country i, namely,
ti = ti (ki);
where ki is the capacity of the transport infrastructure in Country i. We assume that
an investment in transport infrastructure increases capacity, thereby saves the labor (or
time) required for transportation and that the investment is decreasing return to scale:
t0
i ￿ dti=dki < 0;t00
i ￿ d2ti=dk2
i > 0.
The transport cost between two countries is given by c1 + c2. We assume perfect






j + c1 + c2; for i;j = 1;2;j 6= i: (1)
3 Capacity and price of transport infrastructure
In this section, we consider the following ￿ve regimes: the ￿rst-best optimum, free access
regime, pricing regime, private operation regime, and user cost minimization regime.
3.1 First-best optimum (Regime O)
In this paper, the ￿rst-best optimum is characterized as the solution to a global welfare
maximization problem, which is called Regime O. The social planner chooses the price
of infrastructure use, the capacity of infrastructure, and the poll tax. The problem to be












1+f2 + w1t1 + w2t2;wi ￿ ￿i
￿














where W (:) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable in ui and quasi-concave
with respect to the policy variables, and pk
i is the amount of Good z required to produce
5one unit of the transport infrastructure in Country i (or, unit cost of infrastructure). The
second constraint is the budget constraint of the planner.















fi = 0 (3)
The LHS of (2) is the product of the quantity of Goods 1 and 2 transported between the
two countries and the marginal change in the transport cost by an investment in transport
infrastructure in Country i. The LHS is the marginal bene￿t of the investment, while the
RHS is the marginal cost.
Condition (3) means that the price of infrastructure use should be zero. This is natural
since marginal cost of usage, such as operation cost or congestion, does not exist in our
model.
3.2 Free access, investment by national government (Regime F)
This regime has been discussed by Mun and Nakagawa (2008). In this regime, the govern-
ment chooses the level of infrastructure and collects a poll tax to ￿nance the expenditure
while its price of infrastructure use is ￿xed to zero, i.e. the infrastructure is free access.
We call this regime the free access regime or Regime F. The objective of the government



























The LHS of equation (5) is marginal change in transport cost multiplied by the quan-
tity of Good j that Country i imports from Country j. Namely, the LHS is the marginal
bene￿t to Country i of an investment in the transport infrastructure. The RHS is the mar-
ginal cost of the investment. Comparison between conditions (2) and (5) reveals that the
investment rule under free access is inef￿cient since Country i does not take account of
the marginal bene￿t to Country j.
Country i’s optimum level of investment is given as the solution to equation (5). Since
the quantity of import goods depends on the capacity of the transport infrastructure in
Country j, the solution to equations (5) is written as
ki = K
F
i (kj) for i;j = 1;2;j 6= i; (6)
which is considered as Country i’s reaction function. As shown in Mun and Nakagawa




> 0 for i;j = 1;2;j 6= i:
63.3 Pricing and investment by national government (Regime P)
In this regime, the government in Country i chooses not only the level of the transport
infrastructure but also the price of infrastructure use. We call this regime the pricing
regime or Regime P. The government maximizes the welfare of its citizens subject to the









j + cj + f
i + witi;wi ￿ ￿i
￿



















The LHS of (8) is the quantity of Good j imported by Country i that is equal to the
loss in consumer surplus. A rise in the price of infrastructure use increases the price of
the import good in Country i, which harms the welfare of the consumers. The RHS of
(8) is the reduction in the tax burden caused by increase in revenue from infrastructure.





























i=@yi. The numerator of the
RHS of (9) is the marginal revenue for the government. When there are no income effects












In this case, the reduction in the poll tax is equal to the per-capita increase in the govern-
ment revenue.









The LHS of (11) is the increase in Country i’s consumer surplus from one unit increase in
thecapacityofthetransportinfrastructure, whichisthemarginalbene￿toftheinvestment.
2Differentiating equation (7) with respect to ￿i and fi and rearranging the resulting equation yields the




















Substituting this equation into (8), we have the pricing rule.
7The RHS is the increase in the tax burden to ￿nance the investment, which is perceived
as the marginal cost of investment for the country. Condition (11) is the cost-bene￿t rule
for the government that is concerned only with the welfare of its citizens.




















The numerator of the RHS of (12) is the net effect on the government expenditure of a
one-unit investment on transport infrastructure. Note that the investment increases the
trade volume and the revenue from the infrastructure. The second term of the numerator
is the rise in revenue from infrastructure, which reduces the tax burden. Substituting (9)















This equation is identical to the ￿rst-best investment rule. The government that is con-
cerned only about the welfare of its citizens takes into account the bene￿t for the other
country’s citizens in the end. This is because the investment generates additional bene￿t
as described earlier: increase the revenue induced by the expansion of trade volume. This
revenue effect turns out to be equal to the bene￿t for the other country’s citizens.
Country i’s optimal level of investment and its optimal price of infrastructure use are
the solutions to equations (9) and (13). These equations include the quantity of traded
goods that depend on the capacity and price of the transport infrastructure not only in the










i (kj;fj) for i;j = 1;2;j 6= i; (15)
where the super script P represents this regime.
The response of these functions to a change in the transport cost in Country j is not
straightforward. When the demand for an import good does not depend on the disposable
income (x
j
iy = 0 for i;j = 1;2;j 6= i), the response is given in the following lemma. The
proof of this lemma is shown in Appendix A.
Lemma1SupposethatinCountryi(i = 1;2), thedemandofGood j (j = 1;2;j 6= i)
is independent of disposable income. Then, Country i’s investment decisions in response


































i=@ (ci + cj)
2 and xi
jcc = @2xi
j=@ (ci + cj)
2.
This lemma implies that when the demand function for an import good is linear, the
pricing decisions are strategic substitutes3: Country i increases its price of infrastructure
use in response to an increase in Country j’s capacity and to a decrease in Country j’s
price. When the demand is nonlinear and suf￿ciently convex, the pricing decisions may
be strategic complements.
3.4 Private operation of transport infrastructure (Regime M)
Suppose an auction in which the right to build and operate the transport infrastructure is
awarded to the ￿rm offering the highest bid. We assume that this auction is competitive
in that there are suf￿cient number of equally productive ￿rms, that no ￿rm has a market
power in the bidding process, and that there is no collusion between ￿rms. Thus, the pro￿t
of the winner will be zero. We call this regime the private operation regime or Regime M.


























































This investment rule is identical to the ￿rst-best rule as in the case of pricing and invest-
ment by the national government.
The pricing rule is given by (18). The LHS is the marginal revenue for the provider.
Since there is no operation cost, any change in traf￿c does not affect the cost of the
provider. Thus, (18) is the condition of revenue maximization. It should be noted that
when demand for import goods does not depend on income, the pricing rule in this regime
is identical to that in the pricing regime (Regime P).4
Thus, we have the following lemma:
Lemma2SupposethatinCountryi(i = 1;2), thedemandofGood j (j = 1;2;j 6= i)
is independent of disposable income. Then, private operation (Regime M) and pricing and
investment by the national government (Regime P) yield the same outcome.
3If the demand is linear, x
j
icc = xi









4Summing up the equations (10) for two countries, we have
l1x2
1 + l2x1







Since f = f1 + f2, the above equation coincides with (18).
9Private operation by a single provider ignores the effect on consumers’ welfare in the
pricing decision, but avoids double margins in the independent pricing by governments.
Lemma2showsthatthesepositiveandnegativeeffectsoftheprivateoperationareexactly
offset in the absence of income effect.
3.5 User cost minimization (Regime U)
In this regime, competitive bidding is designed so that the right to construct and operate
the transport infrastructure is awarded to the ￿rm proposing the plan that minimizes the













































The above condition states that marginal bene￿t-cost ratios should be equalized across
policy instruments to minimize the user cost: investment in infrastructure and price re-
duction. The LHS of the above equation is the marginal bene￿t-cost ratio of investment:
the bene￿t and cost are appeared respectively in the numerator and denominator. When
the provider invests one unit on the infrastructure, the user cost decreases by ￿wit0
i. This
investment incurs the cost of infrastructure, pk
i. The RHS is the marginal bene￿t-cost ratio
of price reduction. The bene￿t of price reduction by one unit is the reduction in the user
cost by one unit. The cost of price reduction is the reduction in the provider’s revenue by
the quantity of the infrastructure use.






4 Evaluation of alternative regimes





































for i;j = 1;2;j 6= i; (22)
5Note that trade volume must be maximized by user cost minimization. Thus this regime is equivalent
to the patronage maximization discussed in Verhoef (2007).
10where ￿ea; ￿eb; ￿ma; and ￿mb are parameters representing the preferences for consump-
tions of the export and import goods. Then, the demand of a household in Country i for
Good j is given by
x
j







We also specify the function describing the transport technology as




￿ k is the upper limit of the capacity of the transport infrastructure (￿ k = 1).
4.1 Analytical results
In this subsection, we present some analytical results derived for the speci￿c forms of
utility and transport technology functions.
4.1.1 A symmetric economy
Suppose that the sizes and technologies of countries are identical. We present the ranking
of the regimes for several criteria such as the capacity of infrastructure, transport cost,
and welfare. Since our speci￿c utility function does not have an income effect, the private
operation regime attains the same allocation as the pricing regime as shown by Lemma 2.
Thus, we omit the results for the private operation regime. In the following, super scripts
indicate the regimes: O represents the ￿rst best optimum, F the free access regime, P the
pricing regime, and U the user cost minimization regime. The proofs of the following
lemmas and proposition are given in Appendix A.
First, the capacities of infrastructure under alternative regimes are ranked as follows.










i if ￿ma￿wi <
1
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The investment on transport infrastructure is lowest in the pricing regime. Although
the investment rule in the pricing regime is identical with the ￿rst best rule, the investment
level in the pricing regime is lower than that in the free access regime in which the invest-
ment decision is not ef￿cient. Note that the marginal bene￿t of investment (LHS of the
expression for the investment rule) is proportional to the volume of trade. In the pricing
regime, the volume of trade is smaller due to the excessively high price of infrastructure
use. This effect reduces the marginal bene￿t, and leads to a smaller level of investment.
The ranking of the free access regime and the user cost minimization regime depends
on the wage rate and the slope of demand function for import good and transport tech-
nology. If the demand is more elastic (smaller ￿ma), transport technology is backward
11(smaller ￿), or wage rate is lower (smaller wi), the level of investment in the user cost
minimization is higher than that in the free access regime.
The transport cost depends not only on the level of investment but also on the price
of infrastructure use. Thus, the ranking of transport cost is different from that of the
capacity:







where cr = cr
1 + cr
2 for r = O;F;P;and U:
Unlike the levels of investment, the ranking is not contingent. The transport cost is
highest under the pricing regime. User cost in Regime U is higher than that in Regime F.
This result holds, even in the case that the level of investment is higher in Regime U. The
price effect dominates the effect of larger capacity.
The utility function speci￿ed as (22) is a quasi-linear form, thereby the utility is mea-
sured in monetary terms. So we de￿ne global welfare as the sum of utilities of all house-
holds in the economy, that is, W = l1v1+l2v2. We have the ordering of the global welfare
as follows:
Proposition 1 In a symmetric economy, the levels of the global welfare in the regimes















P if ￿ma￿wi > ￿;






￿ 1 + ￿ = 0:
Proposition1showsthatthesecond-bestregimemaybedifferentdependingonthepa-
rameters. The second-best regime in a symmetric economy is the user cost minimization
(Regime U) when the value of (￿ma￿wi) is relatively small, in other words, the demand
is more elastic, transport technology is backward, or the wage rate is lower. Otherwise,
the second-best regime is the free access (Regime F). However, the calibration for numer-
ical analysis suggests that the value of (￿ma￿wi) is very small (much smaller than 0.1).
Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the user cost minimization is more ef￿cient than the
free access.
Additionally, the pricing by national governments (Regime P) is less ef￿cient than the
free-access (Regime F). This result is easily anticipated from Lemmas 3 and 4. Ohsawa
(2000) obtains the contrasting result that the pricing attains higher welfare than the free-
access. His model is different from ours in that the pricing and investment decisions are
determined by voting.
124.1.2 An asymmetric economy
This section examines the asymmetry between two countries in population size and the
wage rates. We have some analytical results concerning the effect of difference in pop-
ulation size. Let us focus on the population distribution holding the sum of the popula-
tion of the two countries constant. Let si be Country i’s share of population such that
si = li=(l1 + l2).
Lemma 5 Under the free-access regime, the effect of the population share of Country








R 0 () s1 Q ￿ma￿w1;
The effect on the user cost is
@cF
@s1




In addition, suppose that the production technology in the two countries are identical,
then, w1 = w2 and p1
1 = p2








The effect of population distribution on the level of investment may be either posi-
tive or negative. Since the value of ￿ma￿wi is small as already mentioned, ￿ma￿w1 <
s1 < 1 ￿ ￿ma￿w2 unless population distribution is extremely uneven. It is likely that
@kF
1 =@s1 > 0 and @kF
2 =@s1 < 0. This is to say, the level of investment is increasing with
the population share of home country.
When the wage rates in two countries are identical, the transport cost, cF, is increas-
ing with asymmetry in population size. This is because investment in infrastructure is
decreasing returns: when the population size in the larger country increases and the size
of the smaller country decreases by the same units, the larger country increases its in-
vestment and the smaller country decreases. However, the transport cost reduction in the
larger country is smaller than the transport cost increase in the smaller country. Conse-
quently, increasing the asymmetry increases the transport cost and decreases the global
welfare.
We turn to the other regimes.






























2; i = 1;2;r = O;P;U:
13Table 1: Parameter values
az
1;az
2 1 ￿ma 0.833333
a1
1;a2
2 1 ￿mb 0.453047
l1 + l2 1 ￿ea 0.833333
pk
1 0.026472 ￿eb 0.67957
pk
2 0.026472 ￿ 0.06












Lemma 6 shows that the effects of population distribution on the investment levels and
transport cost depend on the difference in the FOB prices. This is explained as follows. In
this model, the transport costs of Goods 1 and 2 are identical. The ratio of the transported
quantity of Good 1 to that of Good 2 is determined by the ratio of the FOB price. Suppose
that the FOB price of Good 2 is lower than that of Good 1. Then, a household in Country
1 consumes more Good 2 than a household in country 2 consumes Good 1. An increase
in the size of Country 1 and corresponding decrease in the size of Country 2 raises the
quantity transported between the two countries. This increase in the transportation raises
the investment and reduces the transport cost.
In addition, if asymmetry between the two countries is only in population size, then
the investment levels, transport cost between the two countries, and the global welfare
levels are independent from the population distribution. This implies that the results of
Lemmas 3, 4, and Proposition 1 concerning the ranking between Regimes O, P, U hold if
the population distribution is asymmetric.
4.2 Numerical results
In this subsection, we evaluate the regimes in a more general setting by means of numer-
ical simulations. In the simulation, the parameters are set so as to describe the real world
pictures. We choose several observable indicators that are endogenous variables of the
model, and set the parameter values such that the output of the model ￿ts the prespeci￿ed
(and reasonable) values of the indicators. Details are described in Appendix B. Table 1
represents the values of the parameters and indicators.
4.2.1 Asymmetry in country size
Figure 1 shows the results of simulations for various population distributions. Note that
￿ma￿wi < 1
2 log2 < ￿ under the parameter values in Table 1. The horizontal axis mea-
sures Country 1’s share of the global population, s1: A vertical dotted line is drawn so
that it crosses the horizontal axis at s1 = 0:5 in order to verify the results in lemmas
and the proposition for the symmetric case. Curve O represents the ￿rst best optimum,
14Curve F the free access regime, Curve P the pricing regime, and Curve U the user cost
minimization regime.
Figure 1(a) shows the capacity of the transport infrastructure in Country 1. In the
free access regime, the investment of the country increases with its size, but the sum of
investments of the two countries is almost the same as that in the symmetric economy.
When Country 1’s population share is small, its investment in the free access regime is
smaller than that in the pricing regime: Lemma 3 does not hold when the population
distribution is quite uneven.
Figure 1(b) illustrates the transport time. When the global population distributes uni-
formly, the transport time in the free access regime is lower than that in the pricing regime.
As the distribution becomes more uneven, this relation is reversed.
Figure 1(c) depicts the transport cost. In most situations, the transport cost in the
pricing regime is signi￿cantly higher than those in the other regimes due to the high price
for infrastructure use. For example, in the symmetric case, the price in the pricing regime
is 1.2, while the price in the user cost minimization regime is 0.12. In an asymmetric
economy, the transport time and cost in the free access regime are higher than those in the
symmetric economy. The reason is that the transport technology is decreasing return to
scale: the more a country invests, the less the effect of investment is. When the population
distribution is extremely uneven, the transport cost in the free access regime exceeds that
in the pricing regime.
Figure 1(d) shows the ef￿ciency ratios of the four regimes. The ef￿ciency ratio mea-
sured on the vertical axis is calculated by the following formula:
Ef￿ciency ratio =
W r ￿ W P
W O ￿ W P for r = F;U:
This indicator is utilized for evaluating the relative ef￿ciency of regimes. Note that the
global welfare in the pricing regime turns out to be lowest in almost all cases. The ef￿-
ciency ratio indicates welfare gain of Regime r from the lowest level (Regime P) relative
to the maximum gain. This ￿gure suggests that welfare loss in the pricing regime is very
large. This is due to the distortion caused by pricing behavior, as explained for Figure
1(c).
In this setting, the user cost minimization regime is the second best. Overall, numeri-
cal results suggest that the ranking of regimes is not affected by introducing asymmetry in
population size. However the countries might not have the incentive to adopt this regime.
Figure 1(e) shows the welfare of the representative household in Country 1. When the
population in Country 1 is suf￿ciently small, the household in Country 1 most prefers the
pricing regime.
4.2.2 Asymmetry in productivity
Let us examine the effect of the asymmetry in productivity, which is represented by the
difference in wage rates between countries. Consider an economy that differs from the
symmetric economy only in the wage rate in Country 2. Other parameters are identical
with those in Table 1. Figure 2 illustrates how the relative wage affects the investment,
transport, and welfare. The horizontal axis of this ￿gure is the relative wage rate of
Country 2. The wage rate of Country 1 is ￿xed at one. The notation of the curves is the
same as those in Figure 1.
15Figure 2(a) depicts the investment in Country 1. In each regime, Country 1 reduces
its investment as the wage rate in Country 2 rises. Figure 2(b) shows the investment in
Country 2. In each regime, Country 2’s investment increases with its wage rate. Namely,
a country increases its investment in response to an increase in the home country’s wage,
and decreases in response to an increase in the other country’s wage. In addition, Figure
2(b) indicates that Country 2 invests more in the pricing regime than in the free access
regime when its wage rate is low. In other cases, the level of investment in the pricing
regime is lower. Figure 2(c) shows that ranking of transport time among regimes is not
affected by the difference in wage rates. It is seen that the transport time in each regime
is decreasing with the wage rate in Country 2, but its level is relatively stable against
changes in wage differential. This is because increase in investment of one country is
offset by decrease in the other country, as shown in Figure 2 (a) and (b). Figure 2(d)
depicts the transport cost. In contrast to the transport time, the transport cost increases as
Country 2’s wage rate raises. Figure 2(e) illustrates the ef￿ciency ratio. For any wage rate
of Country 2, the ratio in the user cost minimization regime is higher than that in the free
access regime. As the wage rate of Country 2 falls, the values of ef￿ciency ratios for both
regimes become close to one.
5 Conclusion
If the use of infrastructure is free of charge, the national government does not take into ac-
count the bene￿t of investment in a neighboring country, which leads to under-investment
in terms of resource allocation for the two-country economy as a whole. On the other
hand, it is shown that the investment rule becomes ef￿cient if the government levies a
charge for infrastructure use. The problem with charging is that the price would be inef-
￿ciently high, which negatively affects the level of investment despite the ef￿cient rule.
Comparison of these two regimes, free access vs. pricing by government, shows that the
distortion of pricing in the latter exceeds the loss owing to lack of incentive in investment
decision in the former regime. However, it is also shown that the user cost minimization
regime attains higher welfare than free access. This result suggests that a more ef￿cient
mechanism with pricing could be designed. We need to make further efforts in the future
to explore the possibility of ￿nding better mechanisms.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we give the proof of Lemmas and Propositions.
Proof of Lemma 1
For conciseness, de￿ne the quantity of Good j imported by Country i as Ni = lix
j
i. We
also let the sum of N1 and N2 denoted by N. We assume that the demands for an import
good do not depend on the disposable income.






















where viy = @vi=@yi;Nc = Nic + Njc;Nic = @Ni=@ (c1 + c2);Njc = @Ni=@ (c1 + c2).
Differentiating (24) and (25) with respect to fi;ki, and cj yields
viy
li
f(Nic + 2Njc + fiNcc)dfi + (Njc + fiNcc)wit
0

















idcjg = 0 (27)
where Ncc = Nicc +Njcc;Nicc = @2Ni=@ (c1 + c2)
2 ;Njcc = @2Nj=@ (c1 + c2)
2 : Solving




















￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Nic + 2Njc + fiNcc (Njc + fiNcc)wit0
i
(Njc + fiNcc)wit0




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0:
The fact that ￿ is positive follows from the second order condition of the national welfare




















i is negative, the lemma follows from the above equations.
Proof of Lemma 3
This lemma gives the ordering of the levels of investment on transport infrastructure in a
symmetric economy. In this economy, we have
w1 = w2;l1 = l2;a11 = a22:
From the stability condition of the equilibrium in the free access and the pricing regime,
we have































































































The ordering of the levels of the pricing regime and of the user cost minimization regime















Thus, we have the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4















































































Proof of Proposition 1
Finally, we give the welfare ordering of the regimes. In a symmetric economy, the levels
of global welfare in the regimes are given by
W






































































W U ￿ W





W F ￿ W






Thus, we get W U > W P and W F > W P:
Comparing the ￿rst best global welfare with the global welfare in the user cost mini-
mization regime yields
W O ￿ W
W U ￿ W
= (1 ￿ 2￿ma￿w1)e
2￿ma￿w1
2￿ma￿w1￿1:
19Consider the logarithm of the RHS. The RHS is greater than one if the logarithm is posi-
tive. The logarithm is given by






Investigating the slope and the intercept of f (x), we obtain logx > f (x) for 0 < x < 1.6
This yields W O > W U.
Comparing the ￿rst best global welfare with the global welfare in the free access
regime yields
W F ￿ W




















g (0) = 1 and g
0 (x) < 0 for 0 < x < 1:
This yields
g (x) < 1 for 0 < x < 1:








Finally, let us consider the welfare ordering of the free access regime and the user cost




















￿ (1 ￿ ￿ma￿w1)
#
:






￿ (1 ￿ ￿ma￿w1) = h(￿ma￿w1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ma￿w1);
6We have log1 = f (1) = 0 and
d
dx
logx ￿ f0 (x) =
x ￿ 1
x2 < 0 for 0 < x < 1:
Thus, we have









The function h(x) satis￿es





0 (0) > ￿1;
h










h(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) = 0:
We also have
h(x) ￿ (1 ￿ x) > 0 for x < ￿;




F for ￿ma￿w1 < ￿;
W
U = W
F for ￿ma￿w1 = ￿;
W
U < W
F for ￿ma￿w1 > ￿:
Proof of Lemma 5
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1 ￿ ￿ma￿w2 ￿ s1
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2s1 + (1 ￿ ￿ma￿w2)e
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If w1 = w2 and p1
1 = p2
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which is the latter half of Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 6


















; for i = 1;2;
f
U = ￿ (w1 + w2):






















































































￿￿ma￿ (w1 + w2)




i ; for i = 1;2:





















￿ for i = 1;2;r = O;P;U:
(29)

















￿ ; for r = O;P;U: (30)






















Q 0 () e
￿ma(p1
1￿p2
2) R 1 for i = 1;2;r = O;P;U:
23When w1 = w2 and p1
1 = p2
2, the global welfare satis￿es











































































= 0; for r = O;P;U:
Appendix B
In this appendix, we describe the details of the setting of the parameter values. We select
several key indicators that are constructed by endogenous variables of the model, and set
reasonable values for these indicators based on the available data. Then, we calculate the
parameter values such that the values of the indicators computed by the model reproduce
the predetermined values. Note that we suppose a symmetric economy and free access for
the use of infrastructure (Regime F). The indicators we selected are: Openness; Transport
cost ratio; Price elasticity of demand for import goods; Expenditure ratio for transport






￿ Transport cost ratio: (c1 + c2)=pi
i = 0:2















￿ Expenditure ratio: pk
iki=liwi = 0:01
The openness is de￿ned as the share of import good consumption. According to
IMF(2007), the openness of developed countries in Western Europe are around 0.3 to
0.4, while that of Japan is about 0.1 and that of the United States is about 0.2. As a repre-
sentative value among the above countries, we set 0.2. The transport cost ratio is based on
the estimates by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). They reported that the full transport
cost, which consists of time cost and direct transport cost, is 21 percent of the FOB price.
24We round the value to one decimal place, and get 0.2. The price elasticity of import goods
are chosen so as to be consistent with a standard Cob-Douglas preference. The expendi-
ture ratio is the ratio of the government expenditure on transport infrastructure to the gross
domestic product. In Japan, the expenditure of the special account for road construction
and improvement in Fiscal 2006 is 3,916 billion yen, which is 0.8 percent of the Gross
Domestic Product of Japan.7 Thus, we set the ratio at 0.01.
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26Figure 1 Effects of the population distribution
O:Optimum, F:Free Access, P: Pricng and investment by national government,
U: User cost minimization
(a) Investment in country 1

















































(e) National welfare of country 1










PFigure 2 Effects of the difference in the wage rate
O:Optimum, F:Free Access, P: Pricng and investment by national government,
U: User cost minimization
(a) Investment in country 1











(b) Investment in country 2
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